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Abstract
In a two-country Schumpeterian growth model, we study the incentives for
basic research investments by governments in a globalized world. We find that
a country’s basic research investments increase with the country’s level of hu-
man capital and decline with its own market size. This may explain why some
smaller countries invest so much in basic research. Compared with the optimal
investments achievable when countries coordinate their basic research policies,
a single country may over-invest in basic research. However, the total amount
of decentralized basic research investments is always below the socially optimal
investment level, which justifies policy coordination in this area.
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1 Introduction
Basic research investments aim at acquiring new knowledge without any particular
(commercial) application in view and are arguably a core driver of economic growth
in industrialized countries. Traditionally, basic research investments are a matter of
national policy-making. In some areas, however, international cooperation and coor-
dination are playing an increasingly important role. This is most pronounced in the
European Union, where large research programs are funded by member states and
designed and operated at Union level in Brussels. Moreover, the basic research under-
taken at several major institutes such as CERN in Geneva or by other high-technology
ventures such as ARIANE are the result of joint efforts and agreements between several
countries. Whether international coordination on basic research investment is consid-
ered necessary depends both on the way we conceptualize basic research and on the way
how investments in one country affect growth and welfare in other countries. There
are arguments for and against the coordination of basic research across countries.
When basic research is viewed as a global public good whose output is freely available
and whose consumption is non-rivalrous and non-excludable (Arrow, 1962, Nelson,
1959), the standard “free-rider argument” suggests that uncoordinated investment de-
cisions will entail considerable under-investment.
Basic research may also be viewed as a regional good with international spillovers.
The ideas created by basic research are non-rival goods in the country where these
ideas have been generated. As a consequence, basic research may induce and increase
prospects of success for regional firms’ innovation efforts.1 Moreover, firms with suc-
cessful innovations may be able to increase the rents generated by these innovations
through exports or foreign direct investments. The possibility of capturing rents in
foreign markets by taking away business from established firms suggests that basic
research investments have negative externalities on other countries, which would cause
over-investment.2
When the benefits of basic research are embodied in new products and services, and
1The positive side-effects occur through various channels whose outputs are: supply of trained
scientists and problem-solvers, new scientific instrumentation, network for knowledge diffusion, en-
hancement of problem-solving capacities, start-ups and spin-offs from universities, prototypes of new
products and processes (e.g., Salter and Martin, 2001, Brooks, 1994, Movery and Sampat, 2005, and
Gersbach et al., 2009).
2The negative and positive externalities described in this paragraph are well documented in the
literature (Baily and Gersbach, 1995, Keller and Yeaple, 2003, Alfaro et al., 2006)
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if a country is open to foreign direct investments, this country could benefit from the
basic research of other countries. Foreign direct investments by leading-edge firms
directly contribute to higher levels of productivity by transferring the best production
techniques and products to the host country, thereby raising wages and consumer
surplus. These positive externalities suggest that countries tend to under-invest in
basic research.
This paper develops a framework to study the direction of externalities of basic research
investments and examine whether there is an under- or overprovision of such invest-
ments when each country acts on its own. Two countries select their basic research
investments in each period. Such investments foster the innovation prospects of domes-
tic intermediate firms.3 Firms that develop leading-edge technologies in one country
obtain patents and can enter foreign markets through foreign direct investments to earn
monopoly profits. When another country invests more in basic research, a country will
experience positive and negative externalities of the kind described above. Moreover,
if both countries invest in basic research, this increases the risk that innovation efforts
may be duplicated in the world. Decentralized basic research investments are studied
in a setting with governments maximizing the consumption of the current generation,
and the long-term consequences of such decisions are explored. The basic research
levels attained when countries coordinate their decisions are determined. Finally, the
path of uncoordinated and coordinated basic research investments when governments
maximize the welfare of all generations will be studied.
Our main insights are as follows: First, it is shown that the countries’ basic research
investments act as strategic substitutes. Further, a country’s basic research investments
will increase with its level of human capital, but decline with its relative population
size. The reason for the latter is that a small country can earn large profits from gaining
a monopoly position in a larger foreign country without sustaining the corresponding
deadweight losses accruing abroad. This result may explain why some small open
economies such as Korea or Switzerland invest a lot in basic research.
Second, comparing the decentralized basic research investments with the optimal ones
when countries coordinate to maximize aggregate consumption, our finding is that
both countries under-invest in the decentralized equilibrium if they are similar with
3Hence, basic research is a non-rival good in countries at the technology frontier where new ideas
are created. See Jones and Romer (2010) for systematic reasoning on why ideas in research should be
viewed as partially excludable non-rival goods.
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respect to human capital levels and population sizes. Under asymmetry concerning
either of these characteristics, one of the countries may over-invest in the decentralized
equilibrium relative to the coordination optimum. From the cooperative perspective,
however, the aggregate decentralized basic research investments are too low, even if
one of the countries over-invests in basic research.
Third, our robustness discussion reveals that our results do not change qualitatively
when a one-period or an infinite planning horizon of governments is considered. Of
course, investments in basic research increase quantitatively when longer time hori-
zons are considered. The appendix also discusses the implications of different welfare
objectives under coordination and different assumptions on the costs of basic research.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses the significance of basic
research and relate our paper to the relevant literature in Section 3. Section 4 intro-
duces the model set-up, and Section 5 discusses the households’ and the governments’
optimization problems. The decentralized equilibrium is derived in Section 6, while
the dynamics of the model are described in Section 7. Section 8 compares the decen-
tralized basic research investments with the ones optimal when countries coordinate
to maximize aggregate consumption. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 9. The
proofs and the robustness of our results with respect to infinite planning horizons are
relegated to the appendix.4
2 Significance of basic research
It is useful to put the significance of basic research in perspective. The empirical pattern
of basic research is shown in Table 1. In this table, basic research is defined by the
OECD (2002) as “experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new
knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any
particular application or use in view”. According to this definition, basic research does
not generally provide (commercializable) solutions for specific practical problems, but
rather provides the ideas, methods, prototypes, and materials needed to tackle these
problems. In the US, basic research is mainly conducted by the federal government
and by universities and colleges, and about 80% of it is publicly funded (Cozzi and
Galli, 2009 and NSB, 2012).
Two observations from Table 1 are worth emphasizing. First, basic research is mainly
4Further robustness discussions can be found in the appendix.
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Table 1: Basic research expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Source: OECD 2010)
Country 1994 2007 Country 1994 2007
Argentina 0.11∗ 0.15 Norway 0.25∗∗ 0.27
Australia 0.40 0.43† Poland 0.19 0.17
Austria 0.31∗∗ 0.44 Romania 0.12 0.19
China 0.04 0.05 Portugal 0.13 0.20
Czech 0.16§ 0.37 Russian 0.14 0.19
Republic Federation
France 0.52 0.51 Singapore 0.14 0.43
Hungary 0.24 0.20 Slovak 0.20 0.19
Iceland 0.38§ 0.45 Republic
Ireland 0.12∗∗ 0.29 Slovenia 0.49 0.16
Italy 0.22 0.31 Spain 0.15∗∗ 0.21
Japan 0.38 0.40 Switzerland 0.80∗ 0.81‡
Korea 0.28§ 0.50 United States 0.42 0.47
∗∗ 1993 data
§ 1995 data
∗ 1996 data
† 2006 data
‡ 2008 data
undertaken by industrialized countries that are at, or close to, the world technological
frontier. Some of the emerging countries, such as Korea or Singapore, have considerably
stepped up their basic research efforts. Second, large industrial countries such as
the U.S. or France spend about 0.5% of their GDP on basic research. By contrast,
Switzerland invests a substantially higher share of about 0.8%.
3 Relation to the literature
The theme and the model of our paper are influenced by two lines of research. First,
there is a large body of literature on the importance of basic research in the innova-
tion process and on the strength of international spillovers. Some major articles have
already been been referred to. Second, our paper is related to the theoretical literature
that incorporates basic research into R&D-driven growth models (e.g. Arnold, 1997,
Cozzi and Galli, 2011a, 2009, 2011b, Gersbach et al., 2009). Most of these contributions
focus on the optimal level of basic research in closed economies. There are two papers
that also investigate open economies. In a two-country model, Park (1998) analyzes
4
how cross-country knowledge spillovers affect the optimal level of public basic research,
while the degree of openness determines how large the spillovers are. However, regard-
less of the degree of openness, the knowledge spillovers come free of charge. In our
model, knowledge spillovers occur via foreign direct investments by technologically-
advanced firms, so the cost is the drain of monopoly profits going abroad. Moreover,
the strength of spillovers can be influenced by basic research investments. Accordingly,
the governments face the trade-off of capturing rents in the foreign country and keeping
profits in the country versus realizing technology spillovers from abroad but forgoing
profits in the respective sectors. Neither this trade-off, nor the way two countries will
play the ensuing basic research investment game have been addressed in the previous
literature.5
4 The model
We build on the Schumpeterian growth model with a basic research sector. Two coun-
tries, denoted by H and F , decide about their investment in basic research. The
countries are called H and F . When referring to an unspecified country, the indices
j and k, with j, k ∈ {H,F} are used. If both indices are used, it is always assumed
that j 6= k. In each country and each period t (t = 1, 2, ...) there is a continuum of
identical households of measure Lj , j ∈ {H,F} that enjoy strictly increasing utility in
consumption u(c), inelastically supply one unit of labor, and receive an equal share of
the profits made by the final-good firm and from intermediate goods production. More
precisely, the standard assumptions u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0 are made. For each country
and each period, a government maximizes the well-being of its citizens by publicly
providing basic research, financed by an income tax. Accordingly, a non-overlapping
generations model is considered, in which each generation elects a government to pro-
vide public goods (here basic research) to maximize its welfare. This is equivalent to
maximizing the consumption of the current generation. First, the production side of
the economy is described, and the equilibrium for a given level of basic research for
each country is derived. Then the basic research game played by the countries will be
studied.
5Gersbach et al. (2013) study how openness affects the incentives to invest in basic research in
a single-country model with a given world technology frontier. This paper studies how two coun-
tries strategically interact with their basic research investments, thereby determining the technology
frontier.
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4.1 Production
This section describes the production side of the economy for a particular country j in
a typical period t.
4.1.1 Final-good sector
In the final-good sector, a continuum of competitive firms produces the homogeneous
consumption good Y according to
Yj = L
1−α
j
∫ 1
0
[A(i)xj(i)]
α di. (1)
There is a continuum of varieties [0, 1], xj(i) stands for the amount of intermediate input
of variety i, and A(i) is this variety’s productivity factor. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1)
determines the output elasticity of the intermediate goods. The price of the final
consumption good is normalized to one. In the following, one representative final-good
firm in each country j maximizes its profit, denoted by piyj ,
max
{xj(i)}1i=0,L
d
j
{
piyj = Yj −
∫ 1
0
pj(i)xj(i) di− wjL
d
j
}
, (2)
where pj(i) is the price of good i, wj is the wage level, and L
d
j labor demand. Maxi-
mizing piy with respect to xj(i) and taking pj(i) as given yields the demand functions
for the intermediate goods
xj(i) =
(
αA(i)α
pj(i)
) 1
1−α
Ldj (3)
and the inverse demand function of labor
wj = (1− α)
(
Ldj
)−α ∫ 1
0
[A(i)xj(i)]
α di. (4)
Market clearing in the labor market implies Ldj = Lj , and Lj will be used in the
following.
4.1.2 Intermediate-goods sectors
The intermediate goods x(i) are produced via a one-to-one technology from the final
good. The intermediate firms compete a` la Bertrand in their intermediate sector.
The productivity leader is able to establish a monopoly position, and if there is no
technological leader perfect competition prevails. Accordingly, the intermediate firms
are either monopolistic or fully competitive. Their prices are denoted by pc(i) and
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pm(i), respectively. A competitive intermediate firm sets prices equal to the marginal
costs. As the price of the final good has been normalized to 1, it follows that pc(i) = 1,
and profits vanish. The monopolistic intermediate producer chooses pm(i) = 1
α
. For
the monopolist this leads to profits of pimj (i) = nLjA(i)
α
1−α where n = 1−α
α
α
2
1−α .
4.2 Technological state, innovation, and foreign entry
It is assumed that the world technological frontier is determined by two industrial
countries, e.g. the U.S. and Europe/Japan. The productivity levels of a variety i
produced in the countries H and F in period t are denoted by AHt (i) and A
F
t (i),
respectively. At the end of period t − 1, a sector i in country H has achieved the
technological level AHt−1(i). For each type of intermediate, an innovation may take
place at the beginning of each period. The probability that an innovation in a variety
in country j takes place is denoted by ρjt. If an innovation takes place in sector i in
period t, productivity increases according to At(i) = γAt−1(i) with γ > 1.
4.3 Major assumptions
We make three major assumptions. Our first assumption is that the basic research
investment of a government increases the innovation probability of domestic firms.
Second, other countries are also affected by technological diffusion (or in the extended
model in Section 13.1 by access to the newly-created knowledge). Third, successful in-
novation by domestic firms can be protected by patents (or by complexity and difficulty
of imitation). The assumptions are justified in three steps.
First, there is rich empirical evidence that basic research, as documented in Table 1,
has strong local/regional effects and fosters innovation and growth of firms located in
the same region or country. These positive effects include the supply of scientists and
problem-solvers, joint research projects by universities, private companies, and spin-
offs, and the establishment of scientific networks.6 For domestic firms, basic research is
often the first step in the innovation process (see Grossman and Shapiro, 1987, Aghion
and Howitt, 1996, Cozzi and Galli, 2009 and Aghion et al., 2008). These local/regional
effects are the reason why, as reported in Table 1, even small countries (such as Iceland,
Korea, and Switzerland) invest approximately the same percentage of GDP in basic
research as large industrialized countries such as France or the US. A recent example
6See, e.g. Jaffe et al. (1993), Anselin et al. (1997), Audretsch and Lehmann (2005), Monjon and
Waelbroeck (2003), and Williams (2013).
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is provided by Williams (2013), documenting how the public Human Genome Project
has triggered innovations in life science companies headquartered in the US.
Second, basic research investment by one country can also be beneficial to other coun-
tries, either indirectly in the form of technological spillovers from the entry of suc-
cessfully innovative firms or directly, as outlined by Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962) and
Cohen et al. (2002), by access of firms to increases in the knowledge base in the other
country.
The basic version of the model abstracts from the direct effects of basic research on
the innovation success of firms located in other countries and model the global effects
of basic research through the entry of successfully innovative firms in other countries.
The reason for this is twofold. The empirical evidence for direct effects in the literature
referred to above is weak. Furthermore, incorporating these effects would reinforce our
result. In particular, under-provision of total basic research investments would become
more pronounced, and the need for coordination among countries on basic research
would be reinforced.7
Third, an intermediate firm with a new innovation will be able to protect its innova-
tion through patents (or by other means that make imitations costly). Accordingly,
such a firm will achieve a monopoly on this intermediate product. We stress that
though basic research itself is not patentable, it can be turned into a patent through
commercialization by domestic firms.
4.4 Formalization
We assume diminishing returns on basic research investments of the kind listed in Table
1 in enhancing the innovation prospects of domestic firms. Formally, a particular level
of innovation probability of ρjt in country j for each variety requires basic research
investments in period t of
Rjt(ρjt) = ρ
2
jt
LjA¯t−1
2θj
. (5)
Equivalently, the innovation probability can be written as
ρjt = min
{√
2θjRjt
LjA¯t−1
, 1
}
, (6)
7This is addressed in a suitable extension of our model in Section 13.1.
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where θj is a parameter that captures the efficiency of basic research investments in
country j. In our standard set-up, θj is interpreted as the average (per-capita) level of
human capital in country j. This specification implies that the costs of basic research
decline with a country’s per-capita level of human capital.8 A¯t−1 =
∫ 1
0
[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi
is an index of the average level of technology in the world. With respect to the cost
function of research, two issues are worth noting. First, multiplying by the size of
the country’s population avoids a strong scale effect in the countries’ growth rates.
Second, the higher the knowledge stock is, the more difficult it becomes to innovate
because the costs of basic research will increase with the average technology level A¯t−1.
In this sense, the model features negative intertemporal externalities of knowledge
production. A discussion on the foundation for the specification of the basic research
costs is provided in Section 11 in the appendix.
4.5 Market structure
It has been assumed until now that a new innovation obtains a patent that expires after
one period. As a period it is plausible to think of roughly 20 calender years representing
the period of one generation.9 Further, foreign intermediate firms are assumed to enter
a domestic market if they have higher productivity than domestic producers.10 It
immediately follows that AHt (i) = A
F
t (i) ∀i, ∀t. Consequently, in each period there
are four possible constellations for the market structure in the market for variety i:
(I) domestic monopoly in H , domestic monopoly in F ; (II) domestic monopoly in H ,
foreign monopoly in F ; (III) foreign monopoly in H , domestic monopoly in F ; and
8Section 13.4 discusses the case where the costs of basic research decline with the absolute level of
human capital.
9We chose a period length of 20 years as Article 33 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which all developed countries and most developing countries
signed, provides that ’the term of protection available for patents shall not end before the expiration
of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date’. As a consequence, in most countries’ patent
laws, the term of patent is 20 years from the filing date of the application. Detailed information on
patent laws in different countries is provided by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
under www.wipo.int.
10It is excluded that foreign firms contest domestic markets if they have the same level of produc-
tivity. This can be justified by small entry costs preventing the foreign firm from entering the market.
Alternatively we could assume that there is always one firm that is slightly faster in filing a patent for
the entire world market. Suppose that the probability for the domestic firm to be faster is pd. This
would add a term ρjtρkt(pdp¯ikt − (1 − pd)p¯ijt) to government j’s objective function. If this term is
positive it would additionally increase the incentives for basic research investments in country j and
decrease the basic research investment incentives in the other country. It seems plausible to assume
that firms in both countries have the same probability of obtaining the patent, i.e. pd = 0.5. Then a
small country’s basic research incentives will be even higher whereas those of the large country will
become smaller than in our basic model set-up.
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(IV) perfect competition in H , perfect competition in F . Domestic monopoly means
that an innovator in country j possesses a patent on the highest-quality intermediate
good i in country j, whereas a foreign monopoly would exist if the patent were held by
an innovator headquartered in country k. As patents expire after one period, a sector
is characterized by perfect competition in period t when neither in country j nor in
country k an innovation in this sector occurred in this period.
5 The households’ and the governments’ problems
Our basic model intentionally keeps the households’ problem very simple. In fact, each
household is assumed to offer one unit of labor inelastically to the labor market. They
receive income from working and profits as owners of firms in intermediate sectors and
from final-good producers headquartered in their country.
This allows us to move immediately to the government’s problem. To establish the
latter, total consumption in a country j in a period t will be derived next.
Let us first reconsider expected final-good production, which writes
Yjt = L
1−α
j
[∫ 1
0
[1− qt][At−1(i)]
αγα
(
xmj (i)
)α
di+
∫ 1
0
qt[At−1(i)]
α
(
xcj(i)
)α
di
]
, (7)
where the abbreviation qt ≡ (1− ρjt)(1− ρkt) is used. The first integral represents the
part of final-good production resulting from the sectors where an innovation has taken
place. In these sectors either a foreign innovator has entered the intermediate-good
market or a domestic innovator has offered a technologically advanced product. The
probability of an innovation in sector i in period t is [1 − qt]. With complementary
probability qt no innovator is successful in sector i, and the technological level remains.
As discussed earlier, in sectors where no innovation occurs there is no patent protec-
tion and hence perfect competition prevails. The part of final output attributed to
these sectors is reflected by the second integral. Since the innovation probabilities are
not sector-specific, inserting (3) and making some minor mathematical manipulations
yields
Yjt = Lj
[
(1− qt)γ
α
1−αα
2α
1−α
∫ 1
0
[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi+ qt α
α
1−α
∫ 1
0
[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi
]
. (8)
Using the index of the average technological level in the world A¯t−1 =
∫ 1
0
[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi
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yields
Yjt = LjA¯t−1α
α
1−α
[
qt + (1− qt)γ
α
1−αα
α
1−α
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
y(qt)
, (9)
Increasing the number of innovations in the aggregate means reducing qt. Consequently,
additional innovations have a positive effect on output if and only if α
α
1−αγ
α
1−α > 1,
which is equivalent to γ > 1/α. This illustrates the trade-off associated with in-
novations concerning final-good production. On the one hand, higher quality of an
intermediate good involves higher productivity in final-good production reflected by γ.
On the other, it induces monopoly distortions in the intermediate-good market that
lead to a mark-up on the price of intermediates of 1/α and consequently have a nega-
tive effect on final output. If γ > 1/α, the effect of higher productivity dominates, and
innovations in period t have a positive effect on final output in t. However, if γ < 1/α,
output in t declines as a consequence of an innovation because the monopoly distor-
tions dominate. In the following, it is assumed that γ > 1/α, i.e. that innovations in t
positively affect output in the same period.11
Let us now turn to the expected costs of producing the intermediates used in final-good
production. Making use of (3), the aggregate production costs of intermediate goods
are referred to by Xjt and can be written as
Xjt =
∫ 1
0
(1− qt)x
m
jt(i)di+
∫ 1
0
qtx
c
jt(i)di, (10)
where xmjt(i) = Lj(α
2γαAαt−1)
1
1−α and xcjt(i) = Lj(αA
α
t−1)
1
1−α . Inserting the latter yields
Xjt =
∫ 1
0
(1− qt)γ
α
1−αα
2
1−αLj[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi+
∫ 1
0
qtα
1
1−αLj [At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi, (11)
which can be rewritten as
Xjt = LjA¯t−1α
1
1−α
[
qt + (1− qt)γ
α
1−αα
1
1−α
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x(qt)
. (12)
11In the case of γ < 1
α
, the incentives to perform basic research are reduced. Within our framework,
basic research investments would then be driven mainly by the rents the countries earn in foreign
countries. The extent to which incentives for basic research investments are reduced by the negative
output effect also depends on the planning horizons of the governments, as the effect of innovations
on output will turn positive once the patent has expired. To sum up, if γ < 1
α
, equilibrium basic
research levels would be lower, but not necessarily zero. If γ > 1
α
in some industries and γ < 1
α
in
others, equilibrium basic research levels will be between the case analyzed in our paper and the polar
case described here.
11
The last line describes a trade-off associated with innovations concerning the number
of intermediates. This trade-off is similar to the one identified with respect to final
output. On the one hand, a higher quality intermediate good attracts higher demand
(reflected by γ
α
1−α ). On the other, it is protected by a patent, so supply decreases
relative to the competitive situation (represented by α
1
1−α ). Consequently, if and only
if γ
α
1−αα
1
1−α > 1 the demand effect is dominant, and the amount of an innovative
intermediate used in final-good production increases.
Total expected profits accruing in the intermediate sectors in country j read
pijt =
∫ 1
0
(1− qt)nLj [At−1(i)]
α
1−αγ
α
1−αdi = (1− qt)nLjA¯t−1γ
α
1−α . (13)
The profits in an innovative sector are p¯ijt = nLjA¯t−1γ
α
1−α . Note that up to this
point nothing has been said about the distribution of the profits to domestic or foreign
innovators. This however will play a key role for the total level of consumption in a
country. Given ρkt, expected aggregate consumption in country j amounts in period t
to
Cjt = Yjt −Xjt + ρjt(1− ρkt)p¯ikt − ρkt(1− ρjt)p¯ijt −Rjt. (14)
The first two terms reflect net output of the final good. The third term represents the
profits innovators of country j earn in country k, while the fourth term captures the
profits that innovators of country k earn in country j. Finally, the government has to
finance basic research. We assume that basic research is financed by an income tax. For
simplicity, the tax was not written explicitly into the formula for total consumption.
Using the expressions above, expected aggregate consumption in country j in period t
can be written as
Cjt = LjA¯t−1
[
yn(qt) + γ
α
1−αn
(
ρjt(1− ρkt)
Lk
Lj
− ρkt(1− ρjt)
)
−
ρ2jt
2θj
]
, (15)
where yn(qt) ≡ α
α
1−αy(qt)− α
1
1−αx(qt) represents expected net final-good production –
i.e., expected total production net of the costs for the intermediate products.
The government’s objective function displays the sources of the effects of basic research
described in the introduction.12 First, expected net final-good production depends on
12Note that we assume that both large and small countries produce all types of commodities. It may
be more realistic that the smaller country specializes to a smaller set of intermediate products. Our
analysis could be adapted to this case by reducing the range of intermediate products where the firms
12
the probability that an innovation will occur in either of the two countries. Basic re-
search investments increase this probability and consequently have a positive external
effect on the expected net final-good production of the foreign country via technological
spillovers associated with foreign direct investments. This will lead to under-investment
in decentralized basic research investments. Second, basic research investments deter-
mine the distribution of profits as reflected in the second and third summand. Basic
research enables more domestic firms to obtain profits from the foreign country in sec-
tors where foreign firms have not been successful in creating innovation. Moreover,
basic research investments enable more domestic firms to compete in sectors where
foreign firms have successfully innovated and hence to keep profits in these sectors in
the home country. This tends to prompt countries to over-invest in basic research.
6 Decentralized basic research investment
In this section, the static game of two governments maximizing current domestic con-
sumption by choosing the level of basic research investments and taking the investments
of the other country as given will be considered. This can be interpreted as maximizing
Cjt via control ρjt given ρkt rather than via Rjt. Considering the change in aggregate
consumption in country j, Cjt, in response to a marginal increase in the innovation
probability in country j, ρjt, yields
dyn(qt)
dqt
dqt
dρjt
+ γ
α
1−αn
(
(1− ρk)
Lk
Lj
+ ρk
)
−
ρj
θj
. (16)
It is now possible to simplify this expression in the following way: First, let us recall
the definition of yn(q) = α
α
1−αy(q)−α
1
1−αx(q), where y(q) and x(q) are linear functions
of q. Consequently, the derivative of the expected net output with respect to the
probability that no innovation will occur is a constant, which can be denoted by y′n.
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in the smaller country are active. If basic research is a pure public good increasing the innovation
probability for all intermediate goods, the investment incentives in basic research will be ceteris paribus
higher in the larger country. However, it appears to be reasonable that basic research can be targeted
to sectors, at least to a certain degree. Targeted basic research can be easily incorporated in our model
by assuming that only a subset of sectors benefits from basic research, but the benefits are higher.
13The derivatives of x(q) and y(q) are
dx(q)
dq
= 1− γ
α
1−αα
1
1−α , (17)
dy(q)
dq
= 1− γ
α
1−αα
α
1−α , (18)
and thus y′n = α
α
1−α (1− γ
α
1−αα
α
1−α )− α
1
1−α (1− γ
α
1−αα
1
1−α ).
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Note that y′n is negative as an increase in the probability that no innovation will occur
in either country decreases country j’s net output in expectation. On the other hand,
a marginal increase in the probability of an innovation taking place will increase net
output in expectation by −y′n, which is referred to in the following as y
p
n. It will
also be convenient to use the abbreviations L ≡ Lk
Lj
to denote relative population size
and γ˜ ≡ γ
α
1−α . As the governments’ problems considered in this section are static,
time indices are neglected. With these simplifications, the first-order condition can be
written as
y′n
dq
dρj
+ γ˜n
(
(1− ρk)L+ ρk
)
−
ρj
θj
= 0. (19)
Accordingly, the reaction function of country j is
ρrj(ρk) = θj
[
(1− ρk)y
p
n + γ˜n
(
(1− ρk)L+ ρk
)]
. (20)
In the reaction function, the first term in brackets reflects the effect of a marginal
increase in basic research in country k on country j’s output, while the second term
represents the change in expected net profit flows from technology exchange. The
derivative of ρrj(ρk) with respect to ρk writes as
ρ′j ≡
∂ρrj (ρk)
∂ρk
= −θj
[
ypn + γ˜n
(
L− 1
)]
. (21)
An intuitive interpretation of (21) is that a marginal increase in j’s basic research
investment is less valuable in increasing total output in country j, the higher basic
research investment in country k is due to increased research duplication. In other
words, the higher the basic research investments of the foreign country, the smaller
the number of sectors where no innovation occurs and where domestic basic research
investment could contribute to increasing expected net output. Further, the effect of
a marginal increase in basic research on profit flows obtained from the foreign coun-
try declines with the foreign country’s basic research efforts (reflected by −θj γ˜nL).
However, the profits prevented from flowing into the foreign country increase with the
foreign country’s basic research investment (reflected by θj γ˜n). This implies that only
very large countries (which implies a low value of L), where the motive of keeping
profits in the country dominates, will potentially increase basic research investments in
response to an increase in basic research investments by the other country. It will now
be shown that this will not occur in our framework as basic research investments are
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strategic substitutes for both countries.14 It can also be observed in (21) that the level
of human capital of a country θ affects both the reaction functions’ ordinate intercepts
and their slopes. The same is true of relative population size L. However, the abscissa
intercepts of the reaction functions are independent of θ. Before examining the slopes
of the reaction functions, let us state
Lemma 1
If γ > 1
α
, then ypn > γ˜n.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
The lemma implies that cases where ypn < γ˜n can be neglected because of the assump-
tion that γ > 1
α
. This allows us to determine the signs of the slopes in the countries’
reaction functions:
Proposition 1
Basic research expenditures in the two countries are strategic substitutes – i.e., ρ′H < 0
and ρ′F < 0.
In the remainder of the paper, the parameter set of our analysis is restricted as follows:
Assumption 1
θj(γ˜nL+ y
p
n) < 1, which is equivalent to ρ
r
j(0) < 1.
Assumption 1 requires that a country chooses basic research spending to obtain ρ < 1
(instead of the corner solution ρ = 1) when there are no basic research investments
by the other country. In other words, Assumption 1 says that the basic research
investments of a country cannot with certainty lead to innovation in each intermediate
sector, which seems very realistic.
6.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium analysis shows that there is a unique equilibrium (ρeH , ρ
e
F ) ∈ (0, 1)
2.
14As Lemma 1 stresses, this depends on our assumption that innovations are output-increasing
rather than output-decreasing. In the latter case, the governments’ motives for investing in basic
research are mainly based on capturing profits from the other country. Then there might occur a
situation where the basic research investments of the large country are strategic complements to those
of the small country.
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Proposition 2 (existence of unique equilibrium)
Given Assumption 1, there exists a unique equilibrium (ρeH , ρ
e
F ) ∈ (0, 1)
2 that is char-
acterized by
ρej =
1
θk
(ypn + γ˜nL) +
(
ypn + γ˜n/L
)
(γ˜n(1− L)− ypn)
1
θjθk
− (γ˜n(1− L)− ypn)(γ˜n(1− 1/L)− y
p
n)
. (22)
The proof is given in the Appendix.
6.2 The role of human capital
This section examines how basic research investments are affected by a change in a
country’s research capacity θ, which is also interpreted as a country’s human capital
level. The following proposition gives the results:
Proposition 3 (comparative statics with respect to θ)
(i) If L = 1, then the country with the higher research capacity will invest more in
basic research – i.e., ρej > ρ
e
k if and only if θj > θk.
(ii) In equilibrium, basic research investments of country j will increase with θj and
decrease with θk, i.e.
dρej
dθj
> 0,
dρek
dθj
< 0 . (23)
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Intuitively, if the research capacity of one country, say θj , increases, its basic research
investments will become more productive. Hence, country j will increase its basic
research efforts. The reaction function of country k is not directly affected by a change
in θj but indirectly via the induced change in ρj . As according to Proposition 1
basic research investments are strategic substitutes, k will decrease ρk in response to
the increase in ρj . This result is illustrated with the following example, where both
countries are of equal size L = 1, α = 0.5, γ = 2.1, and θk = 0.03.
15 In this setting, θj
is varied from 0.005 to 0.07. The result is shown in Figure 1.
15Note that the assumption γ > 1/α defines a critical value of γ that depends negatively on α. The
values α = 0.5 and γ = 2.1 were chosen. The latter value is larger by 0.1 than the critical value.
For general innovations, this value of γ may seem relatively high, but it is justified for basic research,
which if successful typically implies large technological improvements. The level of human capital
θk = 0.03 has been specified to obtain realistic growth rates.
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Figure 1: Basic research investments in country j, ρj (blue), and in country k, ρk
(red, dashed), depending on the human capital level in country j, θj , given the level of
human capital in country k, θk = 0.03.
6.3 The role of relative population size
Now how countries of different sizes interact with respect to basic research investments
will be studied.
Proposition 4 (comparative statics with respect to relative population sizes)
(i) Let θj = θk. Then the smaller country will invest more in basic research than the
larger one – i.e., ρej > ρ
e
k if and only if Lk > Lj .
(ii) ρej increases and ρ
e
k decreases with L.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Recall that the relative populations of the countries are defined by L ≡ Lk
Lj
. Inspection
of the first-order condition of the government, (19), reveals that a relatively larger
foreign country k will increase the ratio of profits received from abroad and the profits
paid to the foreign country. By contrast, the relation of market sizes does not play a
direct role for a country’s final output and research costs. Consequently, a relatively
larger market abroad makes innovation and thus basic research investment more at-
tractive. There is no comprehensive study on the relationship between the level of
basic research and the size of population, after controlling for human capital and other
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country characteristics. Nevertheless, two observations from Table 1 are intriguing.
Not only Switzerland has comparatively high basic research expenditures. Other small
countries like Korea, Austria, and Iceland have roughly the same – if not higher – basic
research expenditures as a percentage of GDP as the US. Moreover, with increasing
human capital over the last two decades, several small countries such as Ireland, Korea,
and Singapore have considerably increased their basic research investments. Figure 2
uses the parameter values of the previous example, but here, instead of varying θj , it
is assumed that θj = θk = 0.03 and vary the relative market size L.
0 2 4 6 8
L
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Ρ
Figure 2: Basic research investments in country j, ρj (blue), and in country k, ρk (red,
dashed), depending on relative population sizes L.
7 Dynamics
Let us now turn to the dynamics of the model. Note that the optimal decisions by each
government is independent of the level of technology At−1(i). Hence, the governments
will not change their basic research investments over time. It can be inferred from
Equation (15) that this implies that consumption grows at the rate of the average
technological level. Further, the economy does not exhibit transitional dynamics. To
determine the economies’ growth rate, the world’s average technological level can be
written as
A¯t =
∫ 1
0
[1− q]γ˜[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi+
∫ 1
0
q[At−1(i)]
α
1−αdi (24)
= A¯t−1[γ˜ + q(1− γ˜)]. (25)
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Consequently we obtain
Proposition 5
The growth rate of the two economies is given by
g = (γ˜ − 1)(1− q). (26)
It will now be interesting to establish how the growth rate reacts to changes in θj and
L. The expression γ˜ − 1, which is positive since γ > 1, reflects the innovation steps of
a successful invention and is independent of θj and L. As a consequence, the focus is
on the term 1 − q, which can be rewritten as ρj + ρk − ρjρk. This expression reveals
nicely that the growth rate increases with the sum of basic research investment ρj + ρk
but declines with the amount of research duplication ρjρk. In general, let us state
Proposition 6
A higher level of human capital in one country will lead to higher growth if and only if
−
dρej
dθj
/
dρek
dθj
>
1− ρej
1− ρek
. (27)
An increase in L will involve higher growth if and only if
−
dρej
dL
/
dρek
dL
>
1− ρej
1− ρek
. (28)
A proof of Proposition 6 follows directly from taking the derivative of the growth rate
g with respect to θj and L respectively. Conditions (27) and (28) simply state that the
effect of a change in θj and L on aggregate basic research investments is larger than
the effect on duplication. With respect to a change in θj , the following corollary is
obtained:
Corollary 1
Given Assumption 1, total basic research expenditures will increase if θj becomes larger,
i.e. −
dρej
dθj
/
dρe
k
dθj
> 1.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
The intuition is that if θj increases, ρj will become larger, while ρk decreases. The
latter effect results from the fact that the countries’ basic research investments are
strategic substitutes (cf. Proposition 1). The decline in ρek induced by an increase in
θj is a second-order effect that cannot neutralize the increase in ρ
e
j with respect to
aggregate innovation probability.
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Further, it follows directly from Proposition 6 that the total effect of an increase in θj
on the growth rate is positive if ρj > ρk. Intuitively, in this case an increase in θj will
not only increase aggregate basic research investments but also lead to a more unequal
distribution of investments across countries, thereby reducing the duplication effect
(which is largest for ρj = ρk). As a consequence, an increase of θj will positively affect
the growth rate. This is different if ρj < ρk. Then there exists a trade-off between the
effect on aggregate basic research and duplication. Though analytically not excludable,
in none of our numerical simulations could we find a case where the duplication effect
dominates and leads to negative effects of an increase in θj on growth. The left panel
of Figure 3 shows the typical situation where the growth rate increases with θj .
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Θ j
0.01
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0.03
0.04
g
0 2 4 6 8
L
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0.04
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g
Figure 3: Growth rates depending on human capital in country j, θj , (left) and for
different relative population sizes L (right).
According to our simulations, the growth rate exhibits a U-shaped form when the
relative population size is varied. Numerically, we also find that the aggregate basic
research expenditures are U-shaped in L. Intuitively, this means that the effect of a
relative increase in the population size on aggregate basic research investments tends to
be larger, the more unequal the population shares are. This originates from the incen-
tives associated with the distribution of profits as described earlier. With very unequal
country sizes, the small country has a high incentive to invest in basic research to
capture profits in the foreign market. This, however, also increases the large countries’
basic research incentives, since it is now more valuable to invest in basic research to
keep the profits in the country. Additionally, with more unequal relative basic research
investments, the negative duplication effect is lower, thus reinforcing the U-shape of
the growth rate in L. The right hand panel of Figure 3 illustrates the typical situation.
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8 Coordinated basic research investments
Now let us ask which levels of basic research the countries should choose, if they
coordinate to maximize current aggregate consumption Ct = Cjt + Ckt. Using (15),
the objective can be written as
Ct = Yt −Xt − Rt = A¯t−1
[
(Lj + Lk)yn(qt)− Lj
ρ2jt
2θj
− Lk
ρ2kt
2θk
]
, (29)
where the variables without country indices denote world values, i.e., Yt = Yjt+Ykt etc.
Equation (29) reveals that when consumption is aggregated, the profit flows between
the two countries drop out, and aggregate consumption equals net production minus
total basic research expenditures.
The necessary optimality conditions for coordinated basic research investments are
ρjt = θjy
p
n(1− ρkt)(1 + L), (30)
recalling that ypn = −y
′
n. Comparing condition (30) with the reaction function of the
government’s problem in the non-cooperative setting (19) reveals that the cooperative
solution additionally considers the basic research investments’ effects on the other coun-
try’s output and thus attaches weight (Lj+Lk) to the increase in final-good production
resulting from higher quality intermediates. The denominator Lj in (30) represents the
fact that in absolute terms basic research is less costly in the smaller country.
It is instructive to rewrite the reaction function of a country in the decentralized basic
research investment game as follows:
ρrjt(ρkt) = θjy
p
n(1− ρkt)(1 + L)− (y
p
n − γ˜n)(1− ρk)L+ γ˜nρk. (31)
While the first term reflects the country’s socially optimal level of basic research expen-
ditures, the second and third term illustrate the sources for the country’s sub-optimal
basic research investment. The second summand represents the consumer surplus in
the foreign country that is not taken into account by the domestic country in the
decentralized game, as the latter cares only about the profits that flow in from the
foreign country. For this reason, countries under-invest in basic research. The third
term reflects the country’s incentive to prevent profits from flowing out by making do-
mestic firms more competitive and, in effect, fostering socially wasteful duplication of
innovations. This force leads to over-investment in basic research. Whether a country
over- or under-invests in basic research relative to the social optimum depends on the
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relative market sizes, that is, the relative population sizes of the countries. A relatively
small country, i.e. a country facing a large L, will likely invest a lot in basic research
(recall that ceteris paribus the reaction function ρrjt increases in L) driven by prospects
of reaping profits in the large foreign country. In this case, the second term in the
reaction function dominates the third, and the country is likely to invest too little in
basic research due to its neglect of the consumer surplus in the foreign country. On
the other hand, a large country (with small L) has relatively small profit prospects
in the small foreign market, but its basic research investments are mainly driven by
protecting the profits from flowing to the small foreign country investing aggressively
in basic research, and thus being highly innovative. In this case, the third term may
dominate the second, prompting the country to over-invest in basic research relative
to the social optimum. In summary, driven by the prospects of making large profits
in foreign countries, very small countries invest heavily in basic research but from a
global social-welfare perspective most likely still invest too little. The major motive for
large countries to invest in basic research is to keep profits in the country. Therefore
they may over-invest in basic research relative to the social optimum. From Equation
31 it can be directly inferred that, when both countries are of the same size, there will
be under-investment in basic research. Consequently, for over-investment to occur, L
must be sufficiently smaller than one, implying that only one country – the larger one
– may over-invest in basic research. Hence there will never be a situation where both
countries over-invest in basic research.
The optimality conditions (30) yield the optimal coordinated basic research investments
as
ρeffj =
1
θk
(1 + L)ypn − (1 + L)(1 + 1/L)(y
p
n)
2
1
θjθk
− (1 + L)(1 + 1/L)(ypn)2
. (32)
An analytical comparison of the cooperative solution with the equilibrium values of ba-
sic research in the decentralized setting given in Proposition 2 only yields interpretable
conditions for the symmetric case.
Proposition 7
If Lj = Lk and θj = θk <
1
2
(
1
γ˜n
− 1
y
p
n
)
, then ρeffj > ρ
e
j and ρ
eff
k > ρ
e
k.
The proof follows directly from a comparison of (32) and (22). The condition with
respect to the levels of human capital θ in Proposition 7 is satisfied for reasonable
parameter values. For further comparisons of the cooperative solution and the market
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equilibrium, numerical simulations are used. Our results are derived in the standard
scenario, as specified previously (i.e., α = 0.5, γ = 2.1, θk = 0.03), and it is shown in
Section 13 that our results are very robust. Let us start by holding θj = θk = 0.03
fixed and examining the effect of relative population size. The simulation shows that
if the population sizes are relatively equal, both countries will invest too little in the
decentralized equilibrium relative to the coordination optimum. However, for very
different population sizes, the smaller country, despite having a strong incentive due to
large profit flows from the large country, will invest too little in basic research in the
decentralized equilibrium, while the large country will invest too much. A similar result
is obtained when considering countries with equally large population sizes but different
research capacities θ:16 under-investment by both countries if the human capital levels
are not too different and over-investment by the country with substantially smaller
levels of human capital in the case of pronounced asymmetry with respect to θ.
However, although there is over-investment by one country when population sizes or
research capacities are very asymmetric, our simulations show that the total level of
basic research in the cooperative solution is always higher than the one realized in the
market solution. As a consequence, optimal coordination of basic research will always
produce a higher growth rate.
Our results could be interpreted as follows: First, consider Switzerland and the Euro-
pean Union. They have symmetric levels of human capital but very different market
sizes. As argued earlier, the incentive to gain foreign profit flows may lead to the high
basic research investments by Switzerland. The results in this section suggest that
from a cooperative perspective aiming to maximize aggregate consumption in both
Switzerland and the EU, the already large Swiss basic research investments will still
be too small, while those in the EU tend to be too high. A second interesting case is
a comparison between the EU and the US. Here both market sizes and human capital
levels are approximately equal. Accordingly, our welfare analysis suggests that both
regions invest too little in basic research in the decentralized equilibrium.
As detailed in Section 12 in the appendix, the results remain qualitatively unchanged
when the governments and the social planner have infinite planning horizons.
16Specifically, θk = 0.03 and θj is varied from 0 to 0.4.
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9 Conclusions
Basic research investments in open economies have been studied in a two-country frame-
work, where each country faces the following trade-off: Via basic research investments,
domestic output increases and, additionally, profits can be generated by domestic firms
in the foreign country. On the other hand, basic research is costly and leading-edge
technology could be imported by free-riding on the other country’s basic research ef-
forts. We examine (a) the decentralized game and (b) the cooperative solution where
countries coordinate their basic research investments.
Our findings are that in the decentralized game, basic research investments are strate-
gic substitutes. A country’s basic research investments increase with its average level of
human capital and decrease with the human capital of the foreign country. Moreover,
all else being equal, a small country has higher incentives to invest in basic research
than a large country, because the relation between profit inflows and profit outflows is
greater. This may explain that even comparatively small countries such as Switzerland,
Korea or Singapore invest a lot in basic research which may even exceed in some cases
the share of investments in larger industrialized countries. Compared with the optimal
basic research investments when countries coordinate, there may be cases where one
country will invest too much in basic research in the decentralized setting if the coun-
tries’ human capital levels or market sizes are very asymmetric. However, compared to
the coordination optimum the total investments in basic research are always too low in
the decentralized setting. This directly implies that the global rate of economic growth
will be too low if governments pursue national basic research strategies.
The paper opens up several avenues for future research. First, a suitable extension
would include costs/barriers to foreign direct investment. The existence of barriers is
well-documented in the literature (see, e.g., Evans, 2003, Daude and Fratzscher, 2008,
and Keller and Yeaple, 2013).17 These costs can be incorporated into our model in
two ways. On the one hand, if there are costs to foreign direct investments across all
sectors, country-specific benefits from basic research investments will tend to decline,
as fewer rents can be captured in foreign markets and fewer rents need to be protected
at home. The relative ranking of basic research investments in the decentralized case
and in the coordination case remain unaffected.18 Accordingly, policy coordination
17Considering openness as a governmental choice, it would be interesting to further explore how
openness and basic research investments interact.
18Details are available upon request.
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continues to be justified. On the other hand, only some sectors may face high barriers
to foreign direct investments, so that these investments never occur. If foreign direct
investment is only possible in some sectors, the country-specific consumption gains will
again decline for a specific level of basic research, and the same conclusion as before
can be drawn.
Second, the model can be extended with respect to its micro-economic foundations.
For example, explicitly modeling firms’ decisions on applied research would enrich the
model to capture interactions between basic and applied research. This is particularly
interesting from the perspective of a global labor market with firms and governments
competing for the best applied and basic researchers. Moreover, our model could be
extended to explore the firms’ location and off-shoring decisions and to examine how
these decisions affect the governments’ incentives to invest in basic research.
The model and the perspective of our paper can be broadened further by incorporat-
ing decisions on human capital investments, thereby endogenizing the human capital
variable in the model. Such human capital investments can be left to individuals or sup-
ported by public funding and public institutions. The former case has been dealt with
in subsection 11.1. In the latter case, public funds devoted to education may especially
compete for resources invested in basic research.19 Such an extension increases the op-
portunity costs of basic research investments and can lower basic research investments
in the decentralized case and when basic research investments are coordinated. How-
ever, the qualitative results, and hence the conclusions in our paper, remain unchanged
in simple extensions.20
Extending the model to a multi-country setting would be another important extension.
For this purpose, one can ideally draw on the work of Peretto (2003), who developed
a multi-country Schumpeterian innovation model to study the impact of policies on
growth and welfare. Such a framework would enable us to examine the interplay of
intra-national and international technological spillovers when basic research invest-
ments are made. As basic research investments are strategic substitutes – this is a
robust result in our model –, increasing gains from the coordination of basic research
investments in a multi-country framework should be expected. How precisely a multi-
19Basic research may have an additional positive impact on human capital, which can be added in
our model, and reinforces the results.
20The simplest extension is a human capital production function with decreasing returns on invest-
ments in human capital – or at most, constant returns. A simple functional form is Ljθj = f(Ej), with
Ej denoting aggregate investments in human capital and Ljθj stands for aggregate human capital.
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country setting affects the relative magnitude of coordination gains is an issue that
must be left to future research.
Finally, other approaches to formulate perpetual growth could be combined with the
basic research game of this paper. One especially promising framework in which to
study basic research games is the growth model based on the continuing reduction of
the importance of non-reproducible factors in production, as substantially developed
by Seater (2005) and Zuleta (2008) regarding the social planner solution and Peretto
and Seater (2013) for the balanced growth path and the complete transition path of
the market equilibrium.21
Overall it appears that the analysis of basic research games offers new insights into the
potential and scope of policy-making to spur growth.
21The type of technical change is, however, quite different from other forms of technical change
(see Peretto and Seater, 2013, Peretto, 1999) and from the general characterization of Rebelo (1991).
Thus, incorporating factor-eliminating technical change will require an entire new analysis.
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Appendix
10 Proofs
This section provides the main proofs of our results.
10.1 Proof of Lemma 1
ypn − γ˜n can be written as
ypn − γ˜n = α
α
1−α (γ˜α
α
1−α − 1)− α
1
1−α (γ˜α
1
1−α − 1)− γ˜
1− α
α
α
2
1−α . (33)
This expression can be transformed into
ypn − γ˜n = (α
α
1−α − α
1
1−α )(γ˜α
α
1−α − 1). (34)
For α ∈ (0, 1), we obtain α
α
1−α > α
1
1−α . If additionally γ˜α
α
1−α > 1, which is equivalent
to γ > 1/α, it follows that ypn − γ˜n > 0. ✷
10.2 Lemmata 2 and 3 with proofs
Now let us state and prove two lemmata that are useful for the following proofs. It is
useful to define the function
ρjj(ρk) = θj
[
(1− ρk)y
p
n + γ˜n
(
(1− ρk)L+ ρk
)]
, (35)
which is allowed to assume values in R. Note that on the interval [0, 1] the function
(35) is identical to the reaction function given by (20). As there will be no confusion,
the function in (35) will also be referred to as country j’s reaction function. The inverse
function of ρjj(ρk) is denoted as ρ
j
k(ρj). Hence, ρ
j
k(0) gives the value of ρk such that
country j’s preferred basic research investment is 0, i.e. that ρjj(ρk) = 0.
Lemma 2
If ypn ≥ γ˜n, then ρ
j
k(0) > 1.
Proof. To verify the lemma, it is useful to write
ρjk(0) =
γ˜nL+ ypn
γ˜nL+ ypn − γ˜n
. (36)
The condition on ypn at the beginning of the lemma ensures that the denominator of
(36) is positive. Then the claim in Lemma 2 follows immediately. ✷
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The next lemma examines the slopes of the countries’ reaction functions. For this
purpose, let us use
ρkk(ρj) = θk
[
(1− ρj)y
p
n + γ˜n
(
(1− ρj)(1/L) + ρj
)]
, (37)
representing the reaction function of country k, which is symmetric to ρjj(ρk) as defined
in (35). The inverse of ρkk(ρj) is referred to by ρ
j
k(ρk).
Lemma 3
If ypn ≥ γ˜n, a unique interior equilibrium (ρ
e
j , ρ
e
k) ∈ (0, 1)
2 implies
dρjj(ρk)
dρk
>
dρkj (ρk)
dρk
. (38)
Proof. As the reaction functions are linear, it is sufficient to show that ρjj(0) < ρ
k
j (0).
This follows directly from Lemma 2 and Assumption 1. ✷
10.3 Proof of Proposition 2
According to Proposition 1, ρ′H < 0 and ρ
′
F < 0. It follows directly from Lemma 2
and Assumption 1 that the reaction functions intersect in (0, 1) × (0, 1). Note that
Assumption 1 also prevents the two reaction functions from coinciding, which would
involve multiple equilibria.
The particular equilibrium values (ρeH , ρ
e
F ) follow directly from calculation of the inter-
section of the reaction functions. ✷
10.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us first consider (ii). According to (20),
∂ρ
j
j(ρk)
∂θj
> 0 ∀ρk ∈ (0, 1). The inverse of
the reaction function of k, ρkj (ρk), remains unchanged. As according to Proposition 1,
it holds that ρ′j < 0 and ρ
′
k < 0, it follows from Lemma 3 that the new intersection of
ρjj(ρk) and ρ
k
j (ρk) involves a higher level ρ
e
j and a lower value ρ
e
k.
Now consider item (i). Given the symmetry of the two countries’ reaction functions,
it can be observed that if θj = θk and L = 1, then ρ
e
j = ρ
e
k. The claim in (i) can be
verified by using (ii) and the following line of reasoning: The associated investment in
basic research at any pair (θˆj , θˆk) can be decomposed in two steps. First, let us start
from the basic research levels associated with (θj = θˆk, θˆk), which implies symmetric
basic research investments. Second, basic research levels can be adjusted by increasing
or decreasing θj to θˆj . ✷
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10.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let us start with (ii). As ρ′j < 0 and ρ
′
k < 0, an increase in the relative population size
of country k affects the reaction functions in the following way:
∂ρ
j
j
(ρk)
∂L
> 0 ∀ρk ∈ (0, 1)
and
∂ρk
k
(ρj)
∂L
< 0 ∀ρj ∈ (0, 1). That is, after the increase in L, the reaction function of j
lies above the reaction function before the increase, and the new reaction function of
k lies below the old one. Since ρ′j < 0 and ρ
′
k < 0, this immediately implies that the
new intersection of the reaction functions involves
dρej
dL
> 0 and
dρe
k
dL
< 0.
(i) Since ρj = ρk if L = 1 and θj = θk, it follows directly from item (ii) of this
proposition that ρj > ρk if L > 1. ✷
10.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Consider an increase in θj . According to (20), this involves
∂ρ
j
j(ρk)
∂θj
> 0 ∀ρk ∈ (0, 1),
while the reaction function of k, ρkj (ρk), remains unchanged. As a consequence, the
new equilibrium will still be on ρkj (ρk) and would involve no change in the sum of
basic research investments if
∂ρkj (ρk)
∂ρk
= −1, while
∂ρkj (ρk)
∂ρk
< (>)− 1 would imply higher
(lower) total basic research investment. Due to Assumption 1 and Lemma 2, it holds
that
∂ρkj (ρk)
∂ρk
< −1.
✷
11 Foundation for specification of basic research
costs
Analytical convenience has prompted us to choose the particular functional form of the
relation between the innovation success probability of domestic firms and the invest-
ments in basic research as displayed in Equation 6. More generally, our results require
that the innovation probability be a strictly concave function of basic research invest-
ments. Our specification of the relation between the innovation success probability and
basic research investments can also be interpreted as a reduced form of a more detailed
model formulation where firms additionally invest in applied research to turn the ab-
stract ideas created by basic research into blueprints for new intermediate products. At
a general level, suppose that the probability of innovation success for an intermediate
firm on variety i in country j is given by ρjt,i = min
{
χt (R
BR
jt )
µ
(RARjt,i)
ν
, 1
}
, where RBRjt
is the investment in basic research by the government in country j in period t and RARjt,i
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is the applied research of a firm innovating in sector i. Further parameters such as the
average level of human capital, θ, or the technology frontier, A¯t−1, are subsumed in the
parameter χt, and with respect to the elasticities, it is assumed that µ, ν ∈ (0, 1) and
µ < 1 − ν. This specification exhibits complementarities between basic and applied
research. When, given some basic research RBRjt , the firm under consideration chooses
the optimal level of applied research, it will invest22
RARjt,i = (νχt)
1
1−ν
(
RBRjt,i
) µ
1−ν . (39)
This will be the case for all varieties i.23 Consequently, the probability of successful
innovation will be same for all varieties and can be written as
ρjt = min
{
ν
ν
1−νχ
1
1−ν
t (R
BR
jt )
µ
1−ν , 1
}
. (40)
Under our assumption that µ < 1 − ν, the innovation success probability will be a
strictly concave function of basic research, as is necessary for our results.24 In par-
ticular, our specification in Equation 6 can be recovered by setting µ = 1
2
(1 − ν) and
χt = ν
−ν
√(
2θj
LjA¯t−1
)1−ν
, that is, by defining
ρjt,i = min

ν−ν
√(
2θj
LjA¯t−1
)1−ν
(RBRjt )
1−ν
(RARjt,i)
2ν
, 1

 . (41)
Moreover, this more general definition of innovation success probabilities allows for
different interpretations of the effects of human capital and the technological level on
the innovation success of domestic firms. These are outlined in the next subsection.
11.1 Further micro-foundations
More precisely, there may be several reasons why the marginal productivity of ba-
sic research expenditures increases with the domestic average level of human capital.25
22Details are available upon request.
23We could also consider patent races between the incumbent intermediate firm and outside chal-
lengers. How many resources the firms will optimally spend on applied research will then depend on
the particular specification of the probability of winning the patent given the applied research invest-
ments of the other firms. As long as net profits after deducting the applied research investments are
positive, the forces in our model will remain at work. However, if all rents are dissipated in the patent
races, i.e. the expected net profits are zero, the profit distribution across countries will of course have
no effect on basic research investments.
24Of course, strictly speaking this holds only for the range of basic research investments where
ρjt < 1. However, this is the case we are concerned with in our analysis, as formally delineated by
Assumption 1. This reflects the assumption on the model’s parameters such that endogenously chosen
basic research investments will never be sufficient to achieve an innovation probability of 1.
25More generally, it allows different interpretations with respect to the parameters captured in χt.
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Those interpretations become particularly relevant when human capital is endogenized,
a matter that is addressed in the concluding section. First, it could be the case that
most of the basic researchers are recruited domestically and with better education
and experience the expenditures in basic research will have a larger impact on the
success probability of domestic firms. Second, rather than the basic researchers, who
may be highly mobile and recruited internationally, it could be the applied researchers
in the R&D labs of private firms who are mostly recruited locally and can better
absorb the knowledge created by basic research when their human capital is higher.
This in turn would imply that basic research expenditures are more productive when
domestic human capital is higher. A third interpretation could be that high-tech en-
trepreneurs invest in applied research to commercialize ideas created by basic research.
If the average human capital of these domestic entrepreneurs is higher, they may have
higher business success (rather than higher absorptive capacity). Again, this would
increase the marginal productivity of basic research. These interpretations illustrate
that, when basic research and applied research are complements, all factors making
applied research more productive will also increase the marginal productivity of basic
research.
Our model framework takes the average level of human capital as exogenous. How-
ever, education is at least to a certain degree also a choice of the households. As our
framework focuses on basic research investments of governments in open economies,
the only benefit of human capital is to increase the probability of innovation success.
Consequently, human capital could be endogenized in a similar way as applied re-
search expenditures. Given basic research investments by the government, potential
entrepreneurs choose how much to spend on education to increase their innovation
success probability. We would then again arrive at an equivalent functional form of
the relation between innovation success probability and basic research investment as
in our basic model, where the parameter θ would now be substituted by the exogenous
parameters reflecting the education technology of how resources spent on education are
translated into human capital.
Our specification of the relation between innovation success probabilities and basic
research investments also allows for a simple way of incorporating direct knowledge
spillovers from domestic basic research investments to foreign firms by replacing Rj by
Rj + bRk, where b (0 ≤ b ≤ 1) is a parameter reflecting the strength of basic research
spillovers. The implications of such an extension of the model are discussed in the
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appendix in Section 13.1.
12 Intertemporal basic research investments
Until now, the governments have aimed at maximizing the current period’s consump-
tion but do not consider future periods. There are good arguments for this assumption.
Governments are usually appointed for a restricted period of time and focus on that
period in their decisions. Also, in supranational institutions such as the European Com-
mission, it is rare for the decision process to look any further than 20 years into the
future (which is our interpretation of the model’s period length). Nevertheless, this
section explores whether our results change substantially when the decision-makers
consider longer time horizons. Accordingly, the intertemporal optimization problems
of the governments in the decentralized setting and the one with coordination of basic
research investments to maximize aggregate consumption are depicted. In this section,
it is assumed that households enjoy linear utility from consumption, i.e. u(c) = c.
Unfortunately, the optimization problems cannot be solved analytically. Using the
same parameter values as before, our simulations suggest (a) that the decentralized
equilibrium and the cooperative solution are unique, and (b) that the qualitative re-
sults remain unchanged. Of course, in quantitative terms, the intertemporal solutions
exhibit generally higher levels of basic research investment.
First, the non-cooperative game is examined. Here the governments choose paths
for basic research investment rather than investments in a single period only. The
government’s problem is given by
max
{ρjt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtCjt (42)
subject to the evolution of the stock of technological knowledge
A¯t = A¯t−1[γ˜ + qt(1− γ˜)]. (43)
It is assumed that the discount factor β is sufficiently small for the objective to con-
verge to a finite value. Standard dynamic programming arguments yield the first-order
condition
A¯t−1Lj
[
y′n
d qt
d ρjt
+ γ˜n
(
ρkt + (1− ρkt)L
)]
− A¯t−1Lj
ρjt
θj
+ βcˆjt+1
dA¯t
d qt
d qt
d ρjt
= 0, (44)
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where cˆjt+1 = Cjt+1/A¯t. Note that
cˆjt+1 = Lj
[
yn(qt+1)− γ
α
1−αn
(
ρkt+1(1− ρjt+1)− ρjt+1(1− ρkt+1)L
)
−
ρ2jt+1
2θj
]
, (45)
which will be constant in the steady state. Focusing on the steady state, the first-order
condition of country j reads
Lj
[
ypn(1− ρk) + γ˜n
(
ρk + (1− ρk)L
)]
− Lj
ρj
θj
+ βcˆj(ρj , ρk)(γ˜ − 1)(1− ρk) = 0, (46)
where
cˆj(ρj , ρk) = Lj
[
yn(q)− γ
α
1−αn
(
ρk(1− ρj)− ρj(1− ρk)L
)
−
ρ2j
2θj
]
. (47)
As mentioned, it is not possible to solve this problem analytically.26 Instead, the
coordinated investment problem is introduced first and then, the obtained simulation
results are discussed.
Cooperative basic research investments maximize discounted aggregate consumption
of both countries:
max
{ρjt,ρkt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Cjt + Ckt) (48)
subject to (15) and (43). Using standard dynamic programming methods, the first-
order conditions are given by
A¯t−1(Lj + Lk)y
′
n
d qt
d ρjt
− A¯t−1Lj
ρjt
θj
+ βcˆt+1
dA¯t
d qt
d qt
d ρjt
= 0, (49)
where cˆt+1 = Ct+1/A¯t. Note that the two first-order conditions imply
θjt
θkt
L =
ρjt
ρkt
1− ρjt
1− ρkt
, (50)
which can be interpreted as a condition on the cost efficiency of aggregate research
expenditures. Again the focus is on the steady state of the economy. The necessary
conditions for a maximum can then be rewritten as
(Lj + Lk)y
p
n(1− ρk)− Lj
ρj
θj
+ βcˆ(ρj , ρk)(γ˜ − 1)(1− ρk) = 0, (51)
where
cˆ(ρj , ρk) = (Lj + Lk)yn(q)− Lj
ρ2j
2θj
− Lk
ρ2k
2θk
. (52)
26Conceptually, there exists a formula that allows us to solve explicitly for basic research invest-
ments. However, the extremely long terms only allow interpretation via simulation.
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Two parts can be identified in the optimality conditions for the cooperative solution.
The first two summands in (51) reflect static optimality if the influence of a higher
knowledge stock on future outcomes is neglected. The latter is represented by the last
summand.
Before discussing the numerical simulation results, it is noted that there is the (implicit)
assumption that at time t = 0 both, the governments in the decentralized game and
the social planner in the coordinated problem can fully commit to the entire path of
basic research investments. However, since all first-order conditions are independent of
the technological level, there will be no incentive to re-optimize by a later government
based on the evolution of the technology stock, which is the only stock variable in the
model. Moreover, time-inconsistency problems are precluded by assuming standard
exponential discounting. Consequently, the first-order conditions would remain the
same when considering the non-commitment case where governments or a social planner
with infinite planning horizons were able to re-optimize in each period.
Let us now turn to numerical simulations using the parameter values of our standard
specification. Figures 4 and 5 give the decentralized steady-state equilibrium values
of ρj and ρk (blue) compared to the cooperative solution (red) depending on relative
population sizes and the level of human capital in country j given that θk = 0.03.
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Figure 4: Steady state basic research investments in country j, ρj , (left) and in country
k, ρk, (right) in the decentralized solution (blue) and the coordination optimum (red,
dashed) for different relative population sizes L, when the governments and the social
planner have infinite planning horizons.
The next Figures 6 and 7 show the sum of basic research investments and the growth
rates in the decentralized equilibrium (blue) and the cooperative solution (red, dashed)
depending on L and θj .
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Figure 5: Steady state basic research investments in country j, ρj , (left) and in country
k, ρk, (right) in the decentralized solution (blue) and the coordination optimum (red,
dashed) for different levels of human capital in country j, θj , given the level of human
capital in country k, θk = 0.003, when the governments and the social planner have
infinite planning horizons.
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Figure 6: Total basic research investments in the decentralized solution (blue) and the
coordination optimum (red, dashed) depending on relative population sizes L (left)
and levels of human capital θj (right), given the level of human capital in country k,
θk = 0.003.
A comparison with the results in Section 6 indicates that basic research investments and
growth rates are higher than in the setting where only current consumption is taken into
account. However, qualitatively similar functional shapes and comparisons between
the decentralized and the coordinated solutions are obtained. Also, our simulations
strongly suggest that the above solutions are unique. Deviating reasonably from our
standard parameter values does not change the qualitative results.
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Figure 7: Growth rates in the decentralized solution (blue) and the coordination opti-
mum (red, dashed) depending on relative population sizes L (left) and levels of human
capital θj (right), given the level of human capital in country k, θk = 0.003.
13 Robustness
The robustness of our results will be discussed with respect to the inclusion of direct
knowledge spillovers from basic research, to expanding the range of parameter values
in the simulations, to different objectives of coordination, and to other formulations of
the costs of basic research.
13.1 Direct knowledge spillovers from basic research
In our basic framework, basic research investments in one country do not directly affect
the innovation probability of firms in the foreign country. Here, our definition of the
innovation probabilities of firms is extended to capture such knowledge spillovers from
basic research. In particular, let us define
ρjt = min
{√
2θj
LjA¯t−1
(Rjt + bRkt), 1
}
, (53)
where b ∈ [0, 1] reflects the strength of direct knowledge spillovers from basic research.
With this definition it is possible to write the government’s objective similar to Equa-
tion 15
Cjt = LjA¯t−1
[
yn(qt) + γ
α
1−αn
(
ρjt(1− ρkt)
Lk
Lj
− ρkt(1− ρjt)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
g
jt
−Rjt, (54)
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where gross consumption without research costs is referred to by Cgjt. Again, neglecting
time indices for the static problem, the government’s first order condition now becomes
∂Cgj
∂ρj
∂ρj
∂Rj
− 1 +
∂Cgj
∂ρk
∂ρk
∂Rj
= 0. (55)
The first two summands represent the first-order condition without direct knowledge
spillovers, while the last summand reflects the effect of a marginal increase in basic
research investment on consumption in country j via direct knowledge spillovers to
country k. As it is assumed that knowledge spillovers increase the innovation success
of firms in the foreign country, ∂ρk
∂Rj
> 0, it depends on the sign of the term
∂C
g
j
∂ρk
whether
the knowledge spillovers will increase or decrease basic research investments relative to
the situation without knowledge spillovers. The effect of an increase in the innovation
probability of foreign firms on domestic consumption can be written as follows:
∂Cgj
∂ρk
= ypn(1− ρj)− γ˜n(ρjL+ (1− ρj)). (56)
The first term reflects the increase in domestic output per capita via knowledge spillovers
from domestic basic research investments. As due to knowledge spillovers foreign firms
will innovate with higher probability, there will be a higher chance that an innovation
will occur in a sector where no domestic firm has succeeded in innovating. However,
this increase in the expected net output of final-good production comes at the cost of
forgoing the profits in the respective sector. This cost is captured by the last summand
in (56). Moreover, with more innovative firms in the foreign country, it will be harder
for domestic firms to reap profits in the foreign country. These two cost components
are captured by the second summand. Rewriting Equation 56 as
∂Cgj
∂ρk
= (1− ρj)(y
p
n − γ˜n)− γ˜nρjL, (57)
the terms can be summarized to identify two effects: knowledge spillovers from basic
research investments increase domestic consumer surplus but reduce the profit flows
from abroad. The first effect will increase basic research investments, while the second
will reduce them. It can be observed directly that for very small countries, where L is
very large, knowledge spillovers have a negative effect on basic research investments,
while in large countries, where L is small, the opposite is the case.
Let us now compare the decentralized solution with that of a social planner maximizing
aggregate welfare
Ct = (Lj + Lk)yn(q)− Rj −Rk. (58)
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This involves the following first-order conditions for a maximum:27
∂Ct
∂ρj
∂ρj
∂Rj
+
∂Ct
∂ρk
∂ρk
∂Rj
= 0. (59)
The first term corresponds to the first-order condition in the problem without direct
knowledge spillovers from basic research. The effects of knowledge spillovers on socially
optimal basic research investments are captured by the second term, in particular by
∂Ct
∂ρk
. Dividing the first-order condition by Lj yields
∂Ct
∂ρk
1
L
= (1 + L)ypn(1− ρj). (60)
Now, it is interesting to compare this part of the first-order condition of the socially
optimal solution representing the effects of knowledge spillovers from basic research
with the corresponding part in the first-order conditions of the decentrally acting gov-
ernments. It can be observed that the social planner accounts for the expected global
output increase due to the higher innovativeness of firms in country k as a consequence
of marginally higher basic research investment in country j. However, country j takes
only the increase in its consumer surplus into account. Consequently, in the decen-
tralized solution the inclusion of knowledge spillovers leads to more pronounced under-
investment in basic research relative to the social optimum. This under-investment by
decentrally acting governments is further reinforced by the additional motive of not
reducing the inflowing profits from the foreign country by making the latter’s firms
more competitive via direct knowledge spillovers.
In summary, direct knowledge spillovers from basic research investments in one coun-
try increasing the innovativeness of firms in the foreign country may increase or de-
crease decentrally chosen basic research investments. This depends on the relation
between the increases in consumer surplus in the domestic country and the reduction
in profit inflows from the foreign country. However, relative to the global socially opti-
mal solution, the inclusion of knowledge spillovers constitutes an additional source of
under-investment in basic research.
13.2 Larger range of parameter values
Section 8 derived our results on the relation between the decentralized equilibrium and
the social planner solution by varying either the relative population size while keeping
27The social planner’s objective is strictly concave in Rj and Rk.
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both countries’ human capital levels fixed at θj = θk = 0.03 or by varying country
j’s level of human capital while assuming symmetric population sizes. Our simulation
results show that the results derived in Section 8 possess broad validity with respect
to different combinations of θj , θk and L. Moreover, the same qualitative results are
obtained for a wide range of other parameter values for α, γ, and θk.
13.3 Coordination objective
As already discussed, the coordination of basic research investments aiming to maxi-
mize the sum of aggregate consumption in both countries involves higher levels of basic
research in the smaller country because in absolute terms the costs of basic research
are lower there. This incentive will not be present if coordination is concerned with
maximizing net per capita consumption:
c¯t = A¯t−1
(
2yn(qt)−
ρ2j
2θj
−
ρ2k
2θk
)
. (61)
The necessary conditions for an optimum are
ρj = 2θjy
p
n(1− ρk) . (62)
Note that there is no weighting factor reflecting relative population sizes. Instead, the
contribution of basic research to each country’s per capita output levels obtains the
same weight in the cooperative solution. When comparing (62) with the optimality
conditions of the cooperative solution in Section 8, it can be observed that they coincide
for equal population sizes. The following figures illustrate how the decentralized equi-
librium differs from the coordination optimum maximizing net per capita consumption
for different relative population sizes in the standard scenario.
Figure 8 indicates that when cooperation maximizes net per capita consumption, the
decentralized equilibrium implies too little basic research investment in large countries
and too much in small ones. The contrary was the case in the coordination optimum
maximizing aggregate consumption. The conclusions that both objectives share is that
there is under-investment in basic research if the countries are symmetric with respect
to population size and human capital levels. However, for very asymmetric popula-
tion sizes, the decentralized equilibrium involves total basic research investments and
growth rates that are too high relative to the net per-capita consumption coordination
optimum.
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Figure 8: Basic research investments in country j, ρj , (left) and in country k, ρk, (right)
in the decentralized solution (blue) and the coordination optimum (red, dashed) for
different relative population sizes L, when the social welfare function does not include
population weights.
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Figure 9: Total basic research investments (left) and growth rates (right) in the de-
centralized solution (blue) and the coordination optimum (red, dashed) for different
relative population sizes L, when the social welfare function does not include population
weights.
13.4 Different research costs
Let us now assume that the costs of basic research decline with absolute levels of
human capital rather than with per capita human capital levels. Then the research
costs can be written as Rj = ρ
2
jt/(2θj). Consequently, the governments’ objectives in
the non-cooperative setting can be written as
Cjt = LjA¯t−1
[
yn(qt)− γ
α
1−αn
(
ρkt(1− ρjt)− ρjt(1− ρkt)L
)]
−
ρ2jt
2θj
. (63)
The reaction functions are
ρrj(ρk) = θjLj
[
(1− ρk)y
p
n + γ˜n
(
(1− ρk)L+ ρk
)]
. (64)
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We observe that the only difference with respect to the reaction functions in Section
6 is that the optimal level of a country’s basic research investments increases with its
population size. Now there are two conflicting motives for basic research investment
with respect to relative population size (and given total population). On the one hand,
a relatively larger foreign market increases incentives for basic research due to higher
net profit flows. On the other hand, a smaller home market reduces the incentives for
basic research.
Coordinating basic research to maximize current aggregate consumption Cˆj+Cˆk yields
the following necessary conditions for an optimum: ρj = θj(Lj+Lk)y
p
n(1−ρk) . Hence,
the optimal levels of the coordinated basic research investments do not depend on
relative population sizes but only on the two countries’ total population. The neces-
sary conditions are (up to a constant) equivalent to those derived for the cooperative
optimum in the previous Section 13.3.
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